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L 
Respondents' brief says: (P. 41-42): 
uHow could the granting of the last 
amended cross-complaint of appellant in c;a.ny 
way affect the plaintiffs in this present action 
who seek to quiet title herein? ---None of 
the pla:-ntlffs herein (insofar as this action 
affects the property involved in this appeal) 
were parties to the original action. The res 
had passed from J" Parry Bowen. To set 
aside the former decree as to him would 
not affect the subject matter of the former 
act~O!L Such a procedure would be a nullity, 
of no effect, and merely incidental to the 
present actlon without affecting the res at 
alL Neither would such action affect the 
present owners of the res, as they are not 
parbes to the original action and cannot be 
made such by cross-complaint filed herein." 
To say that the res had passed from 
J" Parry Bowen to the other plaintiffs and 
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2o 
cross defendants by virtue of his default 
judg~ent, and in the same breath to say that 
to set 1t aside would be of no consequence 
is, it seems to us, an incongruous position 
for respondents to take here in view of the 
record they made below with respect to 
that judgmento 
It is true that respondents claimed 
that the former judgment was not void on 
its face, but they also claimed that it is in 
all respects a valid judgment, with respect 
to J o Parry Bowen as well as to the other 
respondents a They deny the cross =com-
plaint~s allegations of fraud in its procure-
ment, admit that they claim ownership inter-
ests under and by virtue of it, introduced 
it in evidence and asked the Court. to grant 
them a summary judgment on the strength 
of it and to hold it res adjudicata as to J-. 
Parry Bowen as well as to the other plain-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tiff 5 and eros s ~defendants which the Court 
dido 
Respondents Keith J o Bowen, J. A. 
Cheney, Guy T. Woodworth, Morley Dea;n, 
Irene M" Dean and Ph11lips Petroleum Com-
pany d~d not attempt to disassociate them= 
selves from J. Parry Bowen in connection 
with the question bf extrinsic fraud in the 
procurement of that judgment. They do not 
plead that they are uinnocent purchasers 
for value'~ and rely on the contention that 
the judgment is valid on it's face and that 
they were not aware of and were not put up~= 
on inquiry as to fraud in connection with it's 
procuremenL On the contrary, they were 
and are one with J o Parry Bowen in seek-
ing to have that judgment held uvalid in 
all respects g" and as res adjudicata as to J. 
Parry Bowen as well as themselves against 
any attack on the ground of fraud however 
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made~ for the following reasons: 
One reason is that the former judg:-
ment, on its face, manifests its vulnerabil-
ity on the ground of fraud. When a judg-
ment roll shows on its face that the judg-
ment is void or voidable, no one claiming 
t:!tle under it is entitled to have it declared 
valid on the plea that he is an innocent pur-
chaser 0 
Another reason is that J. Parry 
Bowen was acting for the other plaintiffs 
and cross =defendants as well as for him-
self in procuring that judgment. 
Cross =defendants were associated 
for that purpose with respect to this and 
other lands, as their complaint shows, and 
are in no posit)on to claim interests in ap-
pellant's land on the strength of that judg~ 
ment as "~innocent purchasers 9 •. 
Aga1np arguing that appellant's at-
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5. 
tack on the prior judgment is a collateral 
attack» respondents' brief asks: 
~~can appellant say that the real 
pla1nhffs in this action, insofar as 
the lands here involved are con-
cerned» had anything to do with the 
former aotion, were guilty of any fraud 
in obtai:ping that judgment against him, 
or can in anywise be brought to an-
swer his allegations against J. Parry 
Bowen? 91 (Res. Br. P. 38) 
While this question is an implied re-
cognition of fraud in obtaining the judgment 
and does not help respondents' argument 
that the cross =complaint against J. Parry 
Bowen and his associates claiming interests 
in the land under it is a collateral attack, 
the answer to this question must be in the 
affirmative, for the above stated reasons 
and for the further reason that J. Parry 
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Bowen, as one of the plaintiffs, with his les-
sees and grantees of interests claimed by 
him in the land, seeks in his, and their com-
plalnt, to have title claimed by him in the 
former achon quieted in them. Fraud in 
the forl"fler action is imputed to all of the 
parbes .insofar as if affects their claims to 
title or interests under the Bowen judgment. 
All are necessary and proper parties defen-
dant in appellant's eros s =complaint. 
Respondents' brief on the same page 
further states~ 
uJo Parry Bowen had no interest 
in the property involved in this appeal 
at the time of the commencement of 
the present action, he having conveyed 
all his interest to Keith J. Bowen by 
quit= claim deed on April 26, 194 7 • ., 
Therefore, the brief continues (P. 39): 
HThe plaintiffs in this action inso-
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7. 
far as the lands involved in this appeal 
are concerned, are innocent purchasers 
for value from J. Parry Bowen", citing· 
U. C. A. 1943, Vol 2. 33-1-3 relating 
to conveyances to defraud creditors--
a contention here made for the first time 
and wholly without merit. 
At this point we call attention to the 
following facts disclosed by the record be= 
fore the Court: 
On September 22, 1943, Burns Hall-
ett9 father=in=law of Keith J. Bowen received 
the admittedly void tax deed from Uintah 
County to 365o93 acres of land including the 
80 acres here involved, (Abs. Title, P. 37). 
On December 8, 1945, Keith J. Bowen, 
(son of J. Parry Bowen), made an oil lease 
to Phillips Petroleum Company of 205.93 
acres y in.cluded in the Tax Deed to Hallett 
and including the 80 acres here involved, 
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8. 
which lease was recorded May 13, 1946, 
(Abs o 39). 
On January 15, 1946, there was re~ 
corded a quit claim deed of the same 205.93 
acres from Burns Hallett and wife to J. 
Parry Bowen, showing that J. Parry Bowen, 
the father, and Keith J. Bowen, the son, 
were alter=egos in dealing with this land. 
J" Parry Bowen, on August 19, 1946, 
(3.-.1/2 months before his default judgment), 
made a ""Mineral Deedu to J. A. Cheney of an 
undivided one~half interest in uan oil, gas 
and other minerals in and under and that 
may be produced fromu 432 aces of land 
including a description of the 80 acres in-
volved in this appeal, "together with the right 
to explore v develop and produce oil, gas and 
other minerals therefrom" with the further 
provision that~ uthis sale is made subject 
to any rights now existing to any lessee or 
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9. 
assigns under any valid and subsisting oil 
and gas lease of record heretofore executed, 
1t being understood and agreed that said 
grantee shall have, receive and enjoy the 
herein granted undivided interest in and 
to all bonuses» rents, royalties and other 
benefits which may accrue under the terms 
of sa1d lease insofar as it covers the above 
descr1bed land from and after the date here-
ofjl precisely as if the grantee herein had 
been at the date of the making of said lease 
the owner of a similar undivided interest 
in and to the lands described and the grantee 
one of the lessors therein n (Referring, of 
course to the Keith J 0 Bowen lease to Phil= 
lips Petroleum Company). (Abs. P. 41) o 
J 0 A. Cheney entered into a royalty 
contract with Guy T. Woodworth, dated July 
26, 1947~ assigning an undivided one-fourth 
interest in oil, gas and other minerals that 
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10. 
may be produced from this land, ~~being 
now under oil and gas leases originally ex-
ecuted to Phillips Petroleum Company" 
(Abso P. 46). 
On December 2, 1946, the default 
decree agamst appellant in Civil action 2388 
in favor of J o Parry Bowen was filed and 
recordedo(Abo Po 51-52}. 
On November 20, 1946, twelve days 
before that default decree was filed and re-
corded, J. Parry Bowen and Frances H .. 
Bowen, his wife, J. A. Cheney and wife and 
Keith J. Bowen and wife made a new lease 
to the Phillips Petroleum Company of 432 
acres including the 80 acres here involved, 
which lease expires on November 20th of 
this year, 1952, no occupation or develop= 
ment having been done under said lease or 
under the original lease made by Keith J. 
Bowen a 
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11. 
On May 15, 194 7, appears a quit 
claim deed dated April 26, 194 7, from J. 
Parry Bowen and wife Frances H. Bowen 
to Keith J. Bowen, of 205 acres including 
the 80 acres here involved and described in 
the void tax deed to Hallett. (Abs. P. 55) 
On May 15 » 194 7, also appears a con-
veyance by Keith J. Bowen and wife, dated 
May 8 11 1947, (one week before the record-
ing of J o Parry Bowen's quit claim deed to 
Keith J o Bowen) 9 to Morley Dean and wife, 
of surface rights on the same acreage, re-
serving (\ •an the minerals, oils, and gases 
upon 9 or under the said lands or any part 
thereof, together with the right to enter 
upon the said lands or any part thereof, to 
explore» dig or mine for such oils, minerals 
and gasesvuo (Abs. P. 56) 
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12o 
The quit~claim deed from J. Parry 
Bowen and wife to Keith J 0 Bowen and the 
deed from Keith J o Bowen and wife to Morley 
Dean and wife were witnessed and acknow-
ledged before Hugh W 0 Colton, as Notary 
Public p who made the affidavit for publica= 
tion of summons in the former actiono 
On September 22, 1948, lis pendens 
was filed in this blanket action of plaintiffs 
and cross ~defendants, led by J. Parry Bow-
en, to many hundreds of acres of lands 
against numerous defendants, including 
appellant with reference to the 80 acres here 
involveda 
So 1t clearly appears that the plain-
tiffs and cross ·-~defendants, although only 
the leader, J 0 Parry Bowen, was named a.s 
plaintiff in Civil action 2388, were associ~ 
ated in acquiring or attempting to acquire 
title to all of the lands described in their 
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13. 
complaint, including appellants land, down 
to the commencement of this blanket action 
to quiet their claims of title, all knowing 
of the vulnerability of their claims of title 
or interest in appellants land and the appar-
ent voidness of the default judgment ob~ 
tained in Civil action 2388. 
It seems to us that the argument 
that the claims of other plaintiffs than J·. 
Parry Bowen under this judgment cannot 
be affected by the fact that it is void, is as 
fallacious as is the argument that the judg-
ment is nevertheless good as to J. Parry 
Bowen's wife and administratrix. 
TAXES 
While it is beside the points at is-
sue, appellants • counsel in their brief per-
sistenly refer to the record of non=payment 
of taxes, and make such statements as: 
6 ~the record shows that appellant has not 
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14. 
paid taxes since the year 1932, and that, in-
cluding the year 1933 to the present time, 
he has paid no taxes on the property. Ap-
pellant does not claim to have paid any taxes 
during said time and offers no excuse for 
failing to make said payments" 0 (Res 0 Br. 
Po 45) 
Apparently counsel is of the opin-
ion here that it would have been material 
in a trial of the issues for appellant to ex-
plain and prove an excuse for the non-pay-
ment of taxes in the years shown in the ab-
stract of titleo But we are quite sure an ob-
jection would be made and properly sustained 
if appellant attempted to do so in a trial of 
the issueso However, since counsels' brief 
invites an explanation we feel at liberty to 
respondo 
First, we call attention to the record 
of payment and non-payment of taxes as 
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15. 
shown in that abstract of title. 
Appellant began payment of taxes on 
this land on February 28, 1916, redeeming 
it from tax sales for the years 1914 and 
1915 (Abs. P. 21), having acquired title as 
of July 2, 1915, (Abs. Pgs. 24, 25, 26, 27). 
Thereafter, all taxes assessed against the 
property were paid until the year 1933, a 
period of nineteen years. In 1933 the coun-
try was in the depth of the great economic 
and industrial depression when fp.rmers 
could hardly make a living much less pay 
any rental for use of lands in the Uintah 
Basin 9 or in the succeeding years through= 
out that depression of the Thirtys. 
In addition to the land here involved 
appellant owned another acreage nearby, but 
in the adjoining county, from which he had 
been receiving annual rentals until the de ... 
pression began when the occupants could 
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16o 
not pay rentals but did undertake to pay 
taxes and water assessments on these lands. 
Tax notices were sent to them for that pur= 
pose but apparently they were not paid. Ap~ 
pellant's neglect to see that they were paid 
is at least somewhat excusable by the fact 
that m 19 34 appellant entered public life, 
g1ving practically all his time to the neg-
lect of his private interests, in carrying on 
a campaign in the political party primaries 
and in the election of that year in which he 
was nominated and elected to the State Sen-
ate of California from Los Angeles County 
and was chairman of the State Committee 
of his party in carrying on the election cam= 
paign" Thereafter appellant continued for 
two years as chairman of his party and was 
occupied four years as State Senator from 
January 1935 to January 1939, and as cand= 
idate for Governor in the primaries and 
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17. 
elections of 1938. The following four years 
appellant served as Governor. Appellants 
time 9 attention, and energy was devoted to 
those activities and duties, which caused 
him to neglect giving personal attention to 
the matter of taxes on his lands in the Uin-
tah Basini as well as to other private inter-
ests. 
The auditors tax deed to the County 
was made April 15, 1938, and no taxes were 
assessed thereafter until 1942, when it aP'- : 
pears that the land was assessed to uuintah 
County (Olsen) care Burns Hallett and that 
a tax of $7.06 was paid; that a similar as-
sessment was made in 1943, and a tax of 
$7 o52 was paid for that year. (Abs. 59) 
Up to 1942 it appears that appellant 
paid all taxes assessed against the land 
since 1913, except for the five year period 
1933 ~ 1938. 
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18. 
In 1944, 1945 and 1946 the land was 
assessed to Burns Hallett and a tax of $12.92 
was paid in 1944 and $14.63 in 1945 and 
$15.68 in 1946. (Abs. 59) 
In 194 7 and 1948 the land was as-
sessed in the name of J. Parry Bowen, but 
the taxes were not paid in either of those 
years and the land went to tax sale for the 
delinquency, (Ab. P. 60). Redemption from 
that tax sale was not made and 1949 taxes 
were not paid until December 30, 1949 (A b. 
P. 61)~ long after this case was at issue, 
and twenty three days after respondents 
sought to obtain, on December 7, 1949, a 
judgment w1thout the presence of appellant. 
Appellant should have gone to Vernal in 
1949 and personally examined the tax re-
cords instead of waiting for respondents' 
Abstract of Title; had he done so he would 
have redeemed the unpaid taxes for the 
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19. 
years 194 7, 1948 and 1949. 
Respondents Abstract does not in= 
elude the record of tax payment in 1950, but 
no denial will be made by them of the fact 
that the tax assessed for that year was paid 
by appellant who also tried to pay the 1951 
tax, only to find that it had been paid long 
in advance of its due date by others. 
So we have a record of tax payments 
by appellant for nineteen years up to Dec-
ember 30, 1949 and tax payments presum-
ably by Hallett for two years up to the time 
of the commencement of Civil Action 2388, 
after Hallett received his tax deed in 1943; 
or five years, including 1942 and 1943, when 
the land was assessed to Uintah County (Ol-
son) care of Burns Hallett. 
Respondents brief says, (P. 47): 
6 
'Had he (appellant) not abandoned 
the property and for more than sixteen 
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20. 
years had paid no attention to it to the 
extent that he did not know the property 
he owned originally, he might have some 
ground for direct attack as did the plain-
tiff in the Liebhardt case~" 
The only thing appellant was uncertain about 
upon receiving service in this case was whe= 
ther the 80 acres described in the complaint 
was the 80 acres which appellant owne.d not 
far away from it, or whether it was the 80 
acres involved in this suit, without looking 
up the description in the records as to each 
property a Respondents • wishing to have this 
property considered as having been "aban= 
doned for 16 years" by appellant will be dis-
appointed by the record of Clarence I. John~ 
sons' testimony, (see transcript) taken out 
of order in anticipation of a trial of the issue 
of adverse possession raised in respondents 
pleadings, which establishes the fact that 
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2.1. 
appellant had never thought of abandoning 
this land and his right and title thereto. 
It is apparent from the record that 
respondents' counsel sought to procure a 
judgment in this action without a trial and 
finally succeeded, by inducing the lower 
court to grant respondents motion for sum., 
mary judgment. Appellant was served with 
summons on September 16, 1949, a year af-
ter the action was commenced. Appellants 
original answer was served and filed in 
October. Respondents counsel had the case 
set for December 7, 1949, without notice to 
appellant, and no notice was given to appel~= 
ant of that setting until on or about that date 
when it was physically impossible for him 
to be present. 
Notwithstanding that fact, as respon= 
dents brief admits, their counsel attempted 
to secure judgment in default of appellants 
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appearance when the Court, upon receiv-
ing a telegram from appellant, protesting 
against a trial on that date because of in-
sufficiency of notice, found that no suffici-
ent nohce had been given, and continued 
the case until January. No decree was 
g1ven uquieting title as against the land 
involved in this appeal", as counsel puts 
it, (Res c Br. P. 2), until the summary de-
cree from which this appeal is taken. No 
decree as to other defendants solely af-
fecting other lands in which appellant 
claimed no interest and with respect to 
which appellant is not named as a defend= 
ant was given until March 1, 19 50, which 
decree by Judge Tuckett, says ''this decree 
shall in no manner affect. the interest of 
Culbert L. Olson in and to'' the 80 acres 
here involved. (App. Br. P. 2 - 3, R. 119). 
It is true that Mr. Stanley, respond-
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23. 
ents counsel, called appellant on the tele-
phone after his failure to procure a default 
decree on December 7, 1949. It is not true 
that appellant then, or ever, or at all, told 
Mr" Stanley that "he probably would dis-
clarm in the matter ... , as stated in respond· 
ents brief, Po 2, or that he had any thought 
of doing so. It is true that appellant asked 
Mr" Stanley when he would send appellant 
his abstract of title and tell appellant the 
basis of respondents claim of title, which 
appellant had repeatedly asked him to do 
beginning immediately after being served 
with summons on September 16, 1949. 
It is not true that appellant request= 
ed of Mro Stanley Ha citation of a case or 
two on adverse possession as viewed by 
the Utah Supreme Court as he was not up 
on those things" (Res. Br. P 2- 3). Ap-
pellant was quite familar with decisions of 
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this court on that subject, particularly one 
in which he represented an appellant in 
whose favor the lower courts adverse decis-
ion was reversed. 
It is true that • •nothing was said in 
that conversation about the decree in Civil 
action 2388". Appellant could not have said 
anything about that decree because he had 
never known or heard of it or of such an 
action, and Mro Stanley, strangely enough, 
in view of his present contention, did not 
see fit to mention it. 
JUDGMENT IN FORMER 
ACTION IS VOID ON ITS 
FACE 
In closing we wish to reiterate and 
emphasize Point I of our opening brief, that 
the original judgment is void on its face and 
should be so held in this case consistent 
with previous decisions of this Honorable 
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25. 
Court.. Had the affidavit for publication of 
summons in the Liebhardt case been a part 
of the judgment roll at that time, there can 
be no doubt, in view of the Court's decis-
ion, that the judgment in that case would 
have been held void on its' face. 
If an affidavit for service by pub-
lication merely states that "'the defendant 
is a non= resident of the state", can it be 
held that an order for publication and a de= 
fault judgment on proof of publication based 
on such an affidavit, is not void on its face 
when» as in this case, the affidavit is made 
a part of the Judgment Roll by legislative 
enactment? For the same reason can an 
affidavit stating that the 44defendant resides 
outside of the State of Utah and person ser-
Vlce cannot be had'g sustain an order for 
service by publication only and sustain a 
default judgment based on such service? 
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If, added to that, the affidavit states that 
affiant has made diligent search and inquiry 
to find defendant in the State of Utah, or a 
statement that ufor the purpose of finding 
said defendant, (affiant) has made diligent 
search 1n the State of Utah and has checked 
the records of both to determine the last 
addre 5 s of the defendant, and finds that his 
last address was John Doe, unknown,. an 
anomalous, inexplicable statement of an 
impossibility on it~s face with a conclus-
ion patently false = because no public re = 
cord of unknown non-residents of Utah is 
or could be kept - sustain such a judgment, 
when there is not a scintilla of "evidenti= 
ary or probative facts u given from which 
anyone could infer that the defendants place 
of re 5 idence was unknown to anybody, not 
even to the affiant or the plaintiff or that 
any effort was made to find the place of 
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27 0 
residence of defendant in or outside the 
state of Utah? 
As stated in our opening brief: "With= 
out swearmg to facts, the affidavit can swear 
to nothing' 9 0 It 1s the same as if no statement 
about hnding defendant were made at all. 
In th1s case it is worse than that in that it 
manifests on its face the fraud it perforce 
perpetrates 0 
We submit that no lawyer can look 
at this perfunctory judgment roll in Civil 
Action 2388 ~ the complaint, a form of sum-
mons with no return thereon, the affidavit 
for the order for publication and the order 
by the Clerk, all filed and made at the same 
time» the pracipe and Clerk's entry of de-
faultp filed immediately on the expiration 
of the period of publication, followed by the 
signing and filing of the default decree -
w:ithout pronouncing that judgment void on 
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it's face mdependant of additional proof of 
ies fraud? No; and the lawyers for respon-
dents so pronounced it and respondents, 
aware of its invalidity, prudently brought 
th:s acLon against appellant for that rea-
son~ (R. p. 188: App. Br. 6 and 7) before 
attempting to occupy or do anything on the 
land. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Culbert L. Olson 
Clyde S. Johnson 
Cyrus G. Gatrell 
Attorneys for appellant 
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